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ARTICLES
WHAT PASSES FOR POLICY AND PROOF IN FIRST
AMENDMENT LITIGATION?
Rodney A. Smolla*
In this Allen Chair Symposium issue of the University of Rich-
mond Law Review, three outstanding scholars have written pro-
vocative pieces on the First Amendment. Professor John Nowak
engages in an exercise of constitutional futurism, "'remembering
the future" to propose a number of relatively radical alterations
of First Amendment doctrine to achieve what he argues should be
the appropriate balance between freedom of speech and fair trials
in "cyber world."' Professor Paul Carrington, arguing that a
communitarian right of citizens to self-government is the princi-
pal that ought to animate our politics and law, has launched a
broadside indictment against contemporary First Amendment
doctrine, attacking an eclectic range of current doctrines, includ-
ing obscenity, offensive speech, separation of church and state,
symbolic speech, forced speech, freedom of association, commer-
cial advertising, libel, and campaign finance.2 Professor C. Tho-
mas Dienes, critiquing decisions that have approved of limita-
tions on the speech of lawyers and other participants in trials,
offers a spirited argument that such restraints are in tension
* George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The
School of Law wishes to acknowledge and thank the Allen family for its gracious support
of this year's Allen Chair Symposium and for the Allen family's generosity to the School of
Law.
1. John E. Nowak, Jury Trials and First Amendment Values in "Cyber World," 34 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1213 (2000) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS § 4 (1970)).
2. Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1167
(2000).
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with First Amendment doctrines governing prior restraints,
newsgathering, and the right to report truthful information.'
This collection of scholarly articles in this Allen Chair Sympo-
sium issue was inspired by a public program held at the Univer-
sity of Richmond School of Law in April 2000, focusing specifically
on ethical and legal policy issues surrounding limitations on the
speech of lawyers in connection with pending judicial proceed-
ings. The public symposium session examined disciplinary rules
restricting extrajudicial comments on pending judicial proceed-
ings;4 prior restraints, such as judicial gag orders that limit law-
yers and other participants in such proceedings;5 and the "collat-
eral bar rule," restricting the defense of those held in contempt
for violating such speech-restricting injunctions.6
It is striking how the issues posed by the live "public" Allen
Chair Symposium session triggered such broad philosophical and
constitutional excursions by these three scholars, each of whom,
in their own unique and inimitable manner, have used the focus
of the symposium as a point of departure for major explorations of
the underlying purpose and function of the First Amendment. Al-
though each of the articles written by the participating scholars
deals, to a greater or lesser degree, with the intersection of the
First Amendment and the administration of the legal system,
they are each notable for their engagement with and critique of
the fundamental philosophical assumptions that underlie the
constitutional principles that drive the resolution of conflicts
posed when free speech and the administration of the legal sys-
tem collide.
A problem that permeates First Amendment law, and one that
I see as prominent in the efforts of these three scholars, is posed
by the title of this introductory essay: "What Passes for Policy
and Proof in First Amendment Litigation?" As the three principal
articles comprising this symposium demonstrate, laws that cur-
tail freedom of speech are always passed for some politically co-
gent reason. By "politically cogent" I mean simply that the legis-
lative body, administrative agency, or court (as in the case of
3. C. Thomas Dienes, Trial Participants in the Newsgathering Process, 34 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1107 (2000).
4. See In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999).
5. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993).
6. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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disciplinary rules or gag orders) that has promulgated the speech
restriction sees itself as pursuing some laudable and worthy pub-
lic policy objective.7
One way to think about First Amendment litigation is to con-
ceive of it as an inquiry into whether the politically cogent ration-
ale for the speech restriction justifies the imposition it exacts on
expression. This in turn might be broken down into two different
kinds of inquiry. We might ask whether the reason proffered by
the legislature is legitimate. This is a critique of the "why" that
undergirds the law. What is the end the law seeks to achieve, and
is it an end we are willing to credit as permissible? This assess-
ment is primarily an exercise in policy, not proof. We are looking
here at ends, not means. Whether the end is permissible is not an
empirical question, but a question of policy judgment.
Secondly, we might ask whether the law actually achieves the
goal it is designed to achieve, or, slicing matters even more thinly,
we might ask how well the law achieves its goal. This is an in-
quiry into the "whether" that lies beneath the law. The issue is
not the legitimacy of the ends, but whether the means chosen ef-
fectuate those ends. This is not a matter of policy judgment, but a
matter of proof.
Treating First Amendment litigation as a two-prong inquiry
into ends and means is nothing new. Much of modern constitu-
tional law doctrine distills into such ends and means investiga-
tions.' This is the backbone methodology of equal protection
analysis It often is also employed to resolve First Amendment
problems.' ° The outcome of First Amendment disputes, in turn,
often centers on how demanding we choose to be in our ends and
7. Those who promulgate regulations placing restrictions on expression rarely, if
ever, see themselves as censors. Rather, they see themselves as enacting rules that vindi-
cate worthy social goals. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 39-42
(1992).
8. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (employing an ends/means test in sub-
stantive due process analysis); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (employing
an ends/means test in dormant Commerce Clause analysis); Ry. Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (employing an ends/means test in "rational basis" equal protec-
tion analysis).
9. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny test and
upholding restrictions on political activity within 100 feet of polling places); Sable Com-
munications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny test to con-
tent-based regulation of "dial-a-porn").
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means evaluations. We typically calibrate this in terms of various
"levels of judicial review." At the most permissive end of the spec-
trum, we usually are willing to give the government virtual carte
blanche to pursue any end. Correspondingly, there will be no
meaningful cross-examination of the government's proof. As long
as the government can at least articulate an arguable connection
between its objectives and the means chosen to vindicate them,
the law will not be struck down. "Rational basis" review in equal
protection analysis is the epitome of this approach.1 At the oppo-
site end of the spectrum, employing tests such as "strict scrutiny,"
courts will severely critique both ends and means. Many ends will
simply be declared entirely out-of-bounds. 2 Even when the ends
are deemed permissible, we will be extremely rigorous in putting
the government to its proof, requiring a relatively tight connec-
tion between the government's objective and the mechanism em-
ployed to try to achieve it.' 3
In these familiar terms, Professor Carrington's proposals
amount to a calculated default to the political process on the issue
of ends. In placing the communitarian value of self-governance as
the highest end of law and policy, Professor Carrington would es-
sentially take courts entirely out of the business of presuming to
critique the ends chosen by the body politic. 4 For example, if the
city of Atlanta wants to ban the showing of the film Carnal
Knowledge because of moral judgments about the content of the
film, the end pursued-public morality-is beyond second-
guessing by the judiciary. It is not for the courts to reason why.' 5
Similarly, eliminating the influence of money in politics, curbing
the excesses of modern advertising, protecting public reputations,
and a myriad of other coherent policy goals all are automatically
11. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ry. Express
Agency, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
12. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (employing a virtual per se
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in First Amendment cases); City of Phila. v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (erecting a virtual per se prohibition in dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis forbidding state restrictions on interstate commerce motivated by
local protectionism).
13. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down federal restrictions on
sexually explicitly material on the Internet, citing alternative approaches to protecting
children); Sable, 438 U.S. 726 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny test to content-based regula-
tion of"dial-a-porn").
14. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 1168-70.
15. Id. at 1180 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (striking down obscen-
ity prosecution of the film Carnal Knowledge)).
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in bounds, because it is not for the judiciary, but rather the politi-
cal process, to define what is out-of-bounds. 6 So too, Professor
Carrington's approach will concede all but the most patently per-
verse law as within the means of the government, without any
exacting insistence on a close causal connection between means
and ends. The court may look faintly into whether the law effec-
tuates its nominal purpose at all, but it may not ask strenuously
how well the law effectuates that purpose.
Modern First Amendment analysis, in marked contrast to Pro-
fessor Carrington's approach, has many pockets of legal doctrine
in which both the why and the whether are vigorously cross-
examined. The heavy presumption against viewpoint-based dis-
crimination, for example, rules out-of-bounds an entire large class
of cogent political reasons for the enactment of speech restric-
tions.' Indeed, the modern anti-viewpoint discrimination rule
strikes at the heart of Professor Carrington's communitarian pur-
suits. The majority's determination that a particular form of ex-
pression is morally repugnant, or inherently inimical to peace
and order, is simply not credited as a permissible purpose at all.' 8
Restrictions on speech in pursuit of the common good, at least
when manifested through prohibitions that discriminate against
viewpoints overwhelmingly judged by the community as contrary
to the common good, are deemed virtually per se unconstitu-
tional.
To say that there are many pockets of First Amendment law
that run directly contrary to Professor Carrington's communi-
tarian agenda, however, is not to say that the First Amendment's
bias for libertarian over communitarian values is universal. Ob-
scenity law is an example. Professor Carrington, and many other
critics of obscenity law, may deem it ridiculously overprotective of
sexually explicit speech.'9 Conceptually, however, obscenity law is
an example of the communitarian impulse prevailing over the lib-
16. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 2, at 1188, 1193, 1197.
17. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down prosecution for cross burning, em-
ploying a virtual per se prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in First Amendment
cases).
18. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction for the
wearing ofajacket containing the message "Fuck the Draft," holding that a state could not
attempt to sanitize public discourse by treating certain vulgar words as unfit for public
display).
19. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 1177-79.
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ertarian, at least as to the kind of "hard core" pornography that
meets the legal definition of obscenity.2" Obscenity remains a
pocket of First Amendment law in which protection of the quality
of the community's moral fabric is deemed a legitimate animating
end.21
In some First Amendment contexts, the determination as to
whether the government is permitted to pursue ends grounded in
some moral judgment may turn on subtleties. When the govern-
ment is perceived as engaged in its own speech, for example, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the rule against viewpoint
discrimination does not apply and that only the political process
itself serves as a check on such discrimination, essentially ren-
dering the no-viewpoint-discrimination principle nonjusticiable in
this setting.22 In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System v. Southworth,23 for example, the Supreme Court stated
that a decision requiring viewpoint neutrality in the administra-
tion of grants to student organizations for expressive activity
should "not be taken to imply that in other instances the Univer-
sity, its agents or employees, or-of particular importance-its
faculty, are subject to" the same First Amendment analysis.24
"Where the University speaks, either in its own name through its
regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse
20. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), in which the Court stated.
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible
to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby.
Rights and interests "other than those of the advocates are involved."...
These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and,
possibly, the public safety itself.
Id. at 57-58 (citing Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951)).
22. See Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 120 S.
Ct. 1346 (2000), in which the court stated:
The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do not reach
the question whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible gov-
ernment action would be sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections
and to allow the challenged program under the principle that the government
can speak for itself. If the challenged speech here were financed by tuition
dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its content,
the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the
speaker.
Id. at 1354.
23. 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000).
24. Id. at 1357.
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faculties," the Court stated, "the analysis likely would be alto-
gether different."25 Echoing the political accountability norms
that Professor Carrington espouses, the Court in Southworth in-
timated that, in this special context of government speech, the
political process, not constitutional doctrine, is the only meaning-
ful check and balance. The solution is to vote the rascals out.
26
Yet when the government allocates its funding not to engage in
its own speech, but to subsidize the speech of private speakers, a
powerful First Amendment prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination kicks in and will be judicially enforced.2
On the proof side of the equation, a significant part of First
Amendment doctrine is wrapped up in determining what shall
pass as persuasive justification for a law, a question that often
turns on the degree of deference courts will grant to legislative
judgments. When high levels of First Amendment protection are
deemed appropriate, such as the tests classically applied when
speech is penalized because it is deemed an incitement to vio-
lence,2" the legislature is not permitted to declare in advance that
certain utterances are inherently harmful.29 Thus a government
25. Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
26. Id. ("When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political
process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse
some different or contrary position.").
27. See id. at 1356-57 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995)).
28. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). The
Court stated:
A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impel-
ling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether
the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so
whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it otherwise,
the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative
definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative
power would be nullified.
Id. at 844; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (holding that a state may not re-
strict words that have a mere bad tendency to be dangerous and that attempts to penalize
"even... utterances of a defined character" must satisfy the standard applied independ-
ently by courts); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court stated:
[A legislative declaration] does not preclude enquiry into the question
whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions existed
which are essential to validity under the Federal Constitution.... Whenever
the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been
invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether
110120011
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prosecution for some specific act of incitement normally must be
grounded in a demonstration that the offending speech was
closely linked to violence in proximity and time.3°
In contrast, when the level of First Amendment protection is
reduced to "intermediate" scrutiny levels, as it is for such matters
as the regulation of commercial speech3' or the regulation of the
"secondary effects" associated with sexually explicit "adult" uses
such as strip clubs, 2 current doctrine is at times substantially
more lax in its proof requirements. This is presently an area of
significant contention in commercial speech law, for example,
where those who seek to expand protection of commercial speech
argue for proof requirements that approach strict scrutiny in
their level of rigor,3 and those who believe commercial speech is
there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if
any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial
as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature.
Id. at 378-79; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding a hate speech
statute confining proscriptions to use of certain symbols unconstitutional even if the con-
duct proscribed would otherwise be unprotected under the standards of Brandenburg);
Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (stating
that the "appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the
whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden in-
trusion on the field of free expression'") (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
284, 286 (1984)).
30. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
31. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980), the Supreme Court articulated the standard that, with some refinements, now
governs regulation of commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more ex-
tensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
32. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).
33. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (arguing for vigorous protection of commercial speech);
Jeffrey Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward a Principled In-
terpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1977) (arguing in favor of treat-
ing all speech as protected under rigorous heightened review standards, without regard to
categories such as "commercial speech" or "libel"); Rodney A- Smolla, Information, Im-
agery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech,
71 TExAS L. REV. 777 (1993) (arguing for vigorous protection of commercial speech).
It may thus be asserted that commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively
enter the debate with full First Amendment protection. See Burt Neuborne, A Rationale
for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROoK. L. REV. 437, 448-53 (1980)
(arguing that commercial speech deserves greater protection than it currently receives to
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less deserving of protection are more inclined to argue for a level
of deference to legislative judgment closer to rational basis re-
view, if indeed commercial speech should receive any protection
at all.
34
Similarly, when dealing with the regulation of sex through
zoning laws that attempt to disperse adult uses within a city, or
ban nude erotic dancing, the Supreme Court now is willing to ac-
cept claims by the government that such regulation is needed to
combat the "secondary effects" associated with such establish-
ments, 35 such as prostitution or the spread of sexually communi-
cable diseases, even when the particular municipality asserting
this need has no empirical evidence that such secondary effects
exist within that municipality.36 The Court thus permits the leg-
islature essentially to assume such effects without proof 3 7 This
has the effect of largely allowing what might otherwise be an im-
permissible, or at least a highly suspect motive-moral revulsion
for the eroticism of nude dancing or pornographic movies-to
drive such policies in disguise. The Court, in effect, permits cities
in such circumstances to look the other way on what is probably
an illicit motive, at least if one believes that moral judgments and
ensure that data necessary for economic and political decisionmaking is available); Martin
H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (1971) (arguing that certain commercial
speech, such as informational and artistic advertising, should receive protection); Martin
H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction:
The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 556 (1997) (arguing for the
soundness of the Supreme Courts protection of commercial speech, but also for a stronger
theoretical justification for this protection); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman,
What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 (1998) (arguing that the exclusion of corporate expression
from the scope of the free speech clause would eliminate a substantial amount of informa-
tion about issues of fundamental importance to the country); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1083-84
(agreeing with the result of a recent Supreme Court case that seemed to reject a notion of
affording a different protection for commercial speech and arguing that the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech is untenable and unwise).
34. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 195-210 (1989);
C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L.
REV. 1, 3 (1976) (stating that "a complete denial of first amendment protection for com-
mercial speech is not only consistent with, but required by, first amendment theory").
35. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976).
36. See Pap'sA.M., 120 S. Ct. at 1395.
37. See id. at 1396. ("Yet to this day, Kandyland has never challenged the city coun-
cil's findings or cast any specific doubt on the validity of those findings. Instead, it has
simply asserted that the council's evidentiary proof was lacking. In the absence of any rea-
son to doubt it, the city's expert judgment should be credited.").
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not secondary effects (which need not be supported any longer
with proof) are what really push the regulation.38
Regulation of attorneys' speech on pending proceedings, gov-
erned by intermediate scrutiny, presents exactly this kind of
proof problem. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,39 the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the rigorous proof requirement
of the "clear and present danger" test, or some rough equivalent
thereof, ought to apply to such extrajudicial lawyer speech.4 ° If,
instead of clear and present danger, a relatively demanding ver-
sion of intermediate scrutiny is applied, lawyers will still enjoy a
substantial measure of protection.4 ' But if the standard is per-
38. See id. at 1409 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have
any kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a
titanic surrender to the implausible. It would be more accurate to acknowl-
edge, as JUSTICE SCALIA does, that there is no reason to believe that such a
requirement "will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kan-
dyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster sexually trans-
mitted disease."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. at 1402 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment)); see also id. at 1405-06 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that
specific evidentiary proof of secondary effects should be required).
39. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
40. See id. at 1069-74 (plurality opinion).
41. See id. at 1077. In Gentile, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
disciplinary rule barring lawyers from making extrajudicial statements that would have a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. at 1060
(plurality opinion, app. B). Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stevens,
Blackmun, and Marshall, would have required a standard higher than a "substantial like-
lihood of material prejudice." Id. at 1051-58 (plurality opinion). While Justice Kennedy's
opinion made it clear that a disciplinary rule need not recite the exact incantation "clear
and present danger," the plurality would have required that a rule must, either on its face
or as authoritatively construed, embody a requirement of "serious and imminent threat" to
meet minimum constitutional standards. See id. at 1037 (plurality opinion). It was this
issue-the question of whether something akin to the highly protective "clear and present
danger" test should apply to attorney comments on pending proceedings-that divided the
Court. See id. at 1051 (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
which on this point commanded the approval of five Justices (Justices Scalia, O'Connor,
Souter, and White joined the Chief Justice on this issue), held that a standard less than
"clear and present danger," or any equivalent test requiring an imminent threat, was ap-
propriate when dealing with the speech of attorneys commenting on pending criminal pro-
ceedings:
When a state regulation implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must
balance those interests against the State's legitimate interest in regulating
the activity in question.... The "substantial likelihood" test embodied in
Rule 177 is constitutional under this analysis, for it is designed to protect the
integrity and fairness of a State's judicial system, and it imposes only narrow
and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech. The limitations are aimed at
two principal evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual out-
come of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury ve-
1104
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ceived as closer to rational basis review, lawyers may be disci-
plined or held in contempt when, realistically, it is quite doubtful
that their extrajudicial statements pose any palpable likelihood of
disruption to the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.42
The questions so artfifly explored by Professors Nowak, Car-
rington, and Dienes all implicate these kinds of calibrations, in
one context or another. They are all part of the ultimate question
that is so prominent in Professor Carrington's provocative piece-
whether we should treat the policy judgments and proof debates
nire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found. Few, if any, inter-
ests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair
trial by "impartial" jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial state-
ments would violate that fundamental right. ... Even if a fair trial can ulti-
mately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or some other device,
these measures entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir dire may
not be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and with in-
creasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change of venue
may not suffice to undo the effects of statements such as those made by peti-
tioner. The State has a substantial interest in preventing officers of the court,
such as lawyers, from imposing such costs on the judicial system and on the
litigants.
The restraint on speech is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The
regulation of attorneys' speech is limited-it applies only to speech that is
substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to
points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending
case; and it merely postpones the attorneys' comments until after the trial.
While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to
an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity,
the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding.
Id. at 1075-76 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965)).
Justice O'Connor cast the pivotal swing vote in Gentile, joining parts of the opin-
ion of the Chief Justice and parts of the opinion of Justice Kennedy. On the central ques-
tion of what First Amendment standard should be applied, Justice O'Connor, in a brief
concurring opinion, wrote:
I agree with much of THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion. In particular, I agree
that a State may regulate speech by lawyers representing clients in pending
cases more readily than it may regulate the press. Lawyers are officers of the
court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep
them from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally protected
speech.... This does not mean, of course, that lawyers forfeit their First
Amendment rights, only that a less demanding standard applies. I agree with
THE CHIEF JUSTICE that the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice"
standard articulated in Rule 177 passes constitutional muster.
Id. at 1081-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959)
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)).
42. This was the position I took in the Morrissey litigation in which I represented the
petitioner in an unsuccessful petition for certiorari. See In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999).
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upon which our First Amendment judgments mainly turn as
questions that should presumptively be left to the democratic
process, or to the courts.
